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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to propose an instrumental analysis of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR). After underlining the corporate governance issues raised by the “new 
firm”, which is vertically disintegrated and intensive in specific human capital, we argue that 
CSR can be useful as a means to regulate power relationships between key productive 
partners of the firm. Based on the analysis of official reports and interviews of the four major 
French operators of telecommunications, we show that CSR is voluntarily used by firms to 
maintain long-term wealth-creative employment and subcontracting relationships, through the 
deployment of formal and informal mechanisms. 
JEL classification: G3, L2, M1 
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Introduction 
The “new firm” - vertically disintegrated and intensive in human capital - has 
dominated the industrial landscape since the beginning of the 1990s (Rajan and Zingales, 
2000). To maintain their positions in ever more competitive markets, many large firms are 
spreading upstream towards R&D and downstream towards services, while at the same time 
refocusing on their manufacturing core (Cohen, 2005). The last fifteen years have therefore 
been marked by the development of outsourcing, the increasing use of subcontracting and the 
concentration of firms on their core business (Langlois, 2003). Under these conditions, 
cooperative relations between firms have increased, due to the reorganisation of production 
processes and in a search for productive complementarities (Richardson, 1972; Loasby, 
1996). These industrial reorganisations, the result of recent financial revolutions (Rajan and 
Zingales, 2001a) and technological revolutions (Hobijn and Jovanovic, 2001), stimulate a race 
to innovation and quality, a race essentially conducted by specialised employees. This is 
because technological advances and increased opportunities for finance and investment have 
shifted intangible assets, notably human capital, towards the heart of firms’ productive 
activity, to the detriment of physical assets, which are now easily reproducible (Appelbaum 
and Berg, 2000; Zingales, 2000). The critical resources of inter-firm relations are increasingly 
of an intangible nature, crystallising in the human, social and organisational capital that 
cannot be subjected to contractible and enforceable rights of control (Asher et al., 2005). 
Thus, the role of the firm has expanded and consists in guaranteeing the specialisation and 
complementarity of its critical human assets throughout the value chain (Gereffi et al., 2005). 
The economic coordination of all the assets decisive to the productive activity of the firm calls 
for a new analysis of the boundaries of the firm and a rethinking of the dominant approach to 
corporate governance (Zingales, 2000). While the importance of human capital constantly 
grows, power is slipping away from the senior executives who possess the residual rights of 
control, being dispersed among all the key partners of the firm, because of the key resources 
they constitute in the firm’s productive transactions. That is why the traditional definition of 
corporate governance is no longer adequate: it cannot be reduced to the system where the 
ownership and control of public listed companies (Berle and Means, 1932) is based on a 
rationale of strengthening the rights of the residual claimants. Corporate governance is 
destined to concentrate on the efficient forms of mobilisation of firm-specific human capital 
to optimise the growth opportunities of the firm (Rajan and Zingales, 2000). Thus, in our 
view, the study of corporate governance must be extended to include the regulation of the 
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exercise of power over firm-specific human capital based on a rationale of both the 
distribution and the creation of value. 
In this context, we examine the contribution of corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
in the domain of corporate governance. More precisely, the aim of this article is to propose an 
original view of CSR as an instrument of governance of firms whose productive activity is 
based primarily on their specific human capital. Long confined to the role of an “extra bit of 
soul” for company managers concerned about ethics and morality, CSR, first defined by 
Bowen (1953)1, gradually developed in listed companies after the Rio Summit of 1992. 
Obliged to recognise their obligations in terms of the environment – principle 16 of the Rio 
Declaration established the “polluter pays” rule2
By concentrating on these latest developments in CSR, this article proposes an 
instrumental approach, distinct from the stakeholder approach that is often chosen as a 
framework for the analysis of CSR
 – and anxious to avoid restrictive 
regulations, companies voluntarily and collectively subscribed to this concept of CSR. But 
over the last decade, which has been marked by both the apparent failures of shareholder 
governance and the spread of CSR to all economic sectors (including those of little 
environmental impact), the objectives attributed to it have changed: less focused on the 
environment (Capron and Petit 2009), they now include questions of governance, whether in 
terms of regulating the network of subcontractors or the appropriation of intangible assets, 
especially human capital. 
3
                                                          
1 According to Bowen (1953): “The term doctrine of social responsibility refers to the idea, now widely voiced, 
that the voluntary assumption of social responsibility by businessmen is, or might be, a practicable means 
towards ameliorating economic problems and attaining more fully the economic goals we seek” (see Acquier and 
Gond, 2007: 6). 
. However, our aim is not to affirm that this conception of 
CSR is the only one that prevails in companies, but to comprehend CSR by placing it in the 
context of governance, to show the role that it now plays in that sphere. To do so, the article is 
organised as follows. In the first section, we use critical resource theory to analyse the extent 
to which the mechanisms of corporate governance need to be modified when the “new firm” 
becomes a form of organisational structure in business. This involves examining the role of 
CSR both in the firm’s internal relations and in its relations of subcontracting. The second 
section is devoted to an application to the telecommunications sector in France, which we 
2 According to principle 16 of the Rio Declaration (1992): “National authorities should endeavour to promote the 
internalization of environmental costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into account the approach that 
the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard to the public interest and without 
distorting international trade and investment” (our italics). 
3 Stakeholder theory is the dominant theoretical approach to CSR (Gond and Mercier, 2005). 
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believe to be emblematic of current developments. Firstly, this sector has witnessed one of the 
clearest movements of refocusing on core business, with activities based largely on the 
specialised human assets of partners. Secondly, as it is not a particularly polluting industry, it 
was not among the pioneers in terms of CSR, but provides evidence from the more recent 
period, beginning in the 2000s, during which the field of CSR was extended to questions of 
governance. 
 
1. The role of CSR in the evolution of the boundaries and governance of the firm  
 
1.1. Specific human capital and the economic boundaries of the firm 
Analysis of firms constructed around specific human assets calls for consideration of 
the intrinsic nature of these fundamental resources, which is obscured in the incomplete 
contracts theory of the firm (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995). 
Since “much of the wealth-generating capacity of most modern firms is based on the skills 
and knowledge of the employees and the ability of the organization as a whole to put those 
skills to work for customers and clients” (Blair, 1995: 231), it is necessary to reconsider the 
boundaries, coordinating role and internal governance of the firm (Araujo et al., 2003; 
Cézanne-Sintès, 2008). From the moment that certain human assets are critical, in other words 
indispensable to the productive activity of the firm (Hart and Moore, 1990), a hold-up 
problem arises in relation to the control of those assets. The threats associated with this hold-
up are all the more serious when the human capital is highly specific, that is to say that its 
field of application is limited outside the relation in which it was initially developed 
(Williamson et al., 1975; Klein et al., 1978). But unlike physical resources (factories and 
machinery) and certain negotiable intangible assets (patents, trademarks, etc.), human capital, 
because it is inalienable and difficult to reproduce, cannot be appropriated, in the legal sense 
of the term, by the firm or its constituent partners. It is impossible to separate human capital 
from its owner, whatever the time horizon considered. Rights of control over human assets are 
therefore equally inalienable (Gibbons, 2005); they do not lie in the domain of legal 
ownership, nor do they change its structure. On its own, the concept of asset ownership is 
therefore insufficient to eliminate the risks of hold-up (Holmström and Roberts, 1998; 
Holmström, 1999). 
Faced with this problem of ex-ante expropriation of the relational quasi-rent, Critical 
Resource Theory (CRT) proposes a solution based on the notion of access as a mechanism of 
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power allocation. Access is defined as “the ability to use, or work with, a critical resource” 
(Rajan and Zingales, 1998: 388). Thus, giving access to a critical resource means granting 
rights of use over a specific asset (tangible or intangible, alienable or inalienable) that is 
difficult to replace, but it also means cooperating with the partners who have obtained those 
rights. Under these conditions, the firm possesses an initial critical resource (specific 
equipment or the particular talent of the entrepreneur) and, as the hierarchical authority 
(Simon, 1951; Williamson et al., 1975), it has priority control over access to its resource. By 
granting its most important partners a right to access, it does not give them an additional 
residual right of decision, but the opportunity to enhance their value by specialising in this 
existing critical resource (Blair and Stout, 1999; Rajan and Zingales, 2001b). Thus, the firm 
promotes the accumulation of co-specific investments4 in human capital that creates more 
value than if the partners only developed their skills for themselves. The regulation of access 
therefore creates reciprocal dependencies, complementarities that tie individuals together and 
that give the firm the power to fix and manage the team of factors of production. The firm can 
thus be perceived as an organisation into a team that favours specialisation through the 
decentralised allocation of access rights (to the detriment of the centralised allocation of 
ownership rights). And yet this mechanism gives rise to implicit relations of a long-term 
nature that affect the creation of rents. In other words, as well as eliminating the risk of hold-
up, the distribution of access rights is a means to manage the development of productive 
knowledge through the co-specialisation of partners5
                                                          
4 According to Hall and Soskice (2001), returns on investments in co-specific assets are highly dependent on 
active cooperation with other specific assets, in other words assets that cannot easily be transferred to an 
alternative use. 
, beyond the legal boundaries of the firm, 
to the outer limits of the activities it coordinates (Sintès-Cézanne, 2008). The allocation of 
access to co-specific human assets therefore establishes the economic boundaries of the firm. 
These are determined by the capacities necessary to the firm to perform its productive 
activities and to interact in a specific manner with different partners in the network of internal 
and external relations that it builds up (Araujo et al., 2003). They therefore expand when the 
firm seeks access, in addition to its own direct skills, to indirect specific resources supplied by 
organisations possessing the appropriate skills, whose activities it coordinates over time (Kay, 
2000; Brusoni, 2005). Consequently, the role of the firm is to combine all the vertical 
productive complementarities of a modular activity by regulating the access to critical 
5 Co-specialisation consists in working together (condition of strong complementarity) within the context of a 
specific relation (condition of low mobility) (Teece, 1986). Consequently, two assets are said to be co-
specialised if, to produce independent goods and services, they have maximum productivity when they are used 
together and lose a lot of their value when they are used separately (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). 
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resources, with a view to producing the final product as efficiently as possible (Jacobides and 
Winter, 2005; Baldwin, 2008). It therefore seeks to organise, over time, the specialisation of 
players who are legally dependent and/or independent, but necessarily economically 
dependent, given the resources mutually dedicated to the competitive productive activity. 
By giving access to a heterogeneous set of productive partners participating in the 
division of labour, the firm assumes a wider role of coordination: it manages the ex ante co-
specialisation of its key partners within its economic boundaries (Sautel and Sintès-Cézanne, 
2007). At the same time, the firm strengthens the power of control of its many partners, 
because, like the firm itself, they tend to master the network of specific investments at the 
heart of the organisation (Zingales, 2000). In particular, the key partners know that their 
human capital is crucial to the competitiveness of the firm, and they possess inalienable rights 
of decision over their critical resource and over the firm. They may then decide unilaterally to 
appropriate a higher share of the jointly-created rent, in a context where the relation cannot be 
broken off without loss to one of the contracting parties (Klein et al., 1978). In other words, 
the accumulation of enough power in the hands of key partners is often accompanied by a 
deterioration in their investment behaviour and may even lead them to exercise their legal 
right to leave the company (Baron and Kreps, 1999). The threat of a partner breaching their 
employment or subcontracting contract does exist and can be very harmful, because it 
drastically cuts the organisational and reputational value of the firm and can even undermine 
its integrity (Teece, 2003). Faced with these considerations, the firm must succeed ex-post in 
maintaining specific relations with the suppliers of critical resources in order to ensure its 
survival. This is a sine qua non, particularly for innovative sectors. For firms operating in 
complex high-technology markets, characterised by high levels of investment in R&D and 
patented specialised applications, it is strictly necessary that their key employees invest in a 
continuous and specific way in human capital (Guilhon, 2004). It is therefore vital for human 
capital-intensive firms to adopt governance mechanisms that encourage their partners to 
invest in human capital that can be applied to the highest wealth-creating activities (Wang and 
Barney, 2006). It is often suggested that a certain share of future rents should be allotted to 
employees to maintain their incentive to specialise. However, since the possibilities of 
renegotiation jeopardize long-term commitments, the incentives are only effective when 
growth prospects are strong enough to guarantee the appropriation of a large share of the rent 
created, which is very uncertain. Corporate governance therefore needs to be revised (Porter-
Liebeskind, 2000; Zingales, 2000; Keenan and Aggestam, 2001) to take into account the 
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power relations between the different partners possessing resources that are essential to the 
productive entity. The problem that must be addressed is how to limit ex post the exercise of 
power by each partner in such a way as to conserve the productive synergies within the firm 
and thereby protect the gains generated collectively through co-specialisation. Because power 
is divided up among the different holders of firm-specific resources, it is inefficient to define 
the objective of corporate governance as the defence of the gains of one sole group of 
individuals. Furthermore, the centrality of human capital renders obsolete the traditional 
disciplinary mechanisms used for the resolution of conflicts of interest and risk-sharing; 
incentive and control must be considered from the perspective of collective, long-term 
commitment by critical members of the firm. From this viewpoint, we argue that more 
attention must be paid to the informal dimensions of the internal regulation of power, so that 
in addition to the objective of allocating value, corporate governance is also given the 
objective of creating value. And even the most fervent advocates of shareholder value, like 
Jensen (2001), eventually acknowledged the advantages of such a change, proposing an 
“enlightened” view of corporate governance. Without calling into question the objective of 
maximising the market value of the firm, which remains, according to these authors, the only 
valid objective6
From this perspective, CSR can be seen as a useful instrument of corporate 
governance, from the moment that it encourages the partners to invest in specific human 
capital and helps to coordinate the ex-post specialisation of specific human assets, things that 
the dominant model is incapable of doing. So our aim is not to treat CSR as the symbol of a 
form of stakeholder governance that could replace shareholder governance, and that might be 
seen as an opposite and alternative to this latter, but to show, on the contrary, how it is 
judiciously used by company managers to introduce formal and informal mechanisms that are 
complementary to the formal mechanisms of corporate governance, rather than substitutes 
(Poppo and Zenger, 2002). 
, they now stress the need to take into account the stakeholder dimension as a 
means to acquire strategic instruments for long-term value creation. 
 
1.2. CSR central to the rethinking of corporate governance 
                                                          
6 Jensen (2001) criticises the stakeholder view of corporate governance on the grounds that it consists in 
simultaneously pursuing a number of different objectives to satisfy the often contradictory interests of the 
different stakeholders. 
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The concept of CSR has been defined on numerous occasions (Rowe 2006). Although 
there are certain elements of divergence between the existing definitions, they share a 
common base that can be summed up as follows: CSR involves the voluntary integration of 
social and environmental concerns into the firm’s objectives, over and above what is required 
by law (see, for example, European Commission, 2001 and McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). It 
therefore bears witness to a conception of the firm that incorporates the views of the different 
stakeholders (Freeman and Reed, 1983). 
CSR has spread rapidly in listed companies since these latter have found themselves 
strongly encouraged to contribute, in one way or another, to sustainable development. The 
Rio Summit (1992) can reasonably be considered the point of departure of a process of 
institutionalisation which, although on a voluntary and decentralised basis, should not lead us 
to neglect the role of public and political pressure. Moreover, it includes a certain measure of 
standardisation of practices (establishment of sets of standards, norms, social and 
environmental ratings agencies, etc.) and is not completely free of penalties, particularly in 
terms of reputation when a company fails to deliver what it has promised. This link between 
the way companies are “obliged” to take CSR on board and the voluntary nature of their 
commitments7 has gradually led them to use it more strategically and less defensively 
(McWilliams et al., 2006; Porter and Kramer, 2006). To the extent that it is they and they 
alone who decide on the occasion and nature of their initiatives, companies have every 
freedom to shape a form of CSR to suit their needs (Lamarche and Rubinstein, 2010). And 
recent econometric studies (Orlitsky et al., 2003; Allouche and Laroche, 2005; Wu, 2006; 
Margolis et al., 2007), using meta-analysis, provide evidence of a positive correlation 
between CSR and the financial performance of the company, which might help to explain 
why, in the United States, listed companies do more in terms of CSR than non-listed ones 
(Guthrie and Miller, 2007). At the same time, there was a perceptible change in the content of 
the non-financial reports of the largest listed companies of various OECD countries between 
1993 and 20088
                                                          
7 This link between “obligation” to address the issue of CSR and freedom of action is explicit in France, the only 
country where the law (article 116 of the law on New Economic Regulations) requires listed companies to issue 
an annual communication on the social and environmental consequences of their activity, without requiring any 
specific action — their freedom of action is not challenged. 
: Capron and Petit (2009) show that in the 1990s, these reports were almost 
exclusively focused on environmental issues; in the 2000s, their tone changed considerably, to 
8 Capron and Petit (2009) base their analysis on six successive surveys conducted by the audit, accounting and 
consulting group KPMG between these two dates. 
9 
include social and economic concerns, while at the same time these reports spread to every 
sector (and particularly the sectors of finance, information and communication). 
That being the case, can we understand this new development of CSR and relate it to 
the specific governance problems raised by the “new firm”, vertically disintegrated and 
human capital-intensive? Let us recall that vertical disintegration poses problems concerning 
governance of the network, because it deprives the prime contractors of the means of 
hierarchical coordination. Their capacity to direct all the subcontractors then assumes central 
importance, and it cannot be delegated. While refocusing on their core business, their primary 
activity, they must at the same time develop a “savoir faire faire” (“knowing how to get 
something done”) (Mariotti, 2004: 714), at the risk, if they do not do so, of finding themselves 
liable in the event of failure by one of their subcontractors. This is all the more pertinent for 
firms with strong visibility and reputation, because they are more likely to be held to account 
by NGOs, which choose prestigious targets in order to gain wider coverage (Gereffi and 
Mayer, 2004). For example, Nike and Puma have both been fiercely criticised for the working 
conditions tolerated among their subcontractors. In response, Nike published a detailed report 
in 2005 on the working conditions in the group’s 704 subcontracting firms. Puma, for its part, 
joined the Fair Labor Association (FLA), which applies an accreditation procedure to the 
working conditions in all the subcontracting firms of each of its members (Palpacuer, 2008). 
Ultimately, in both cases, this amounts to defining the economic boundaries of the firm and 
the perimeter of its responsibility, through the agency of a CSR approach. 
Consequently, in the absence of a hierarchical mode of coordination, the prime 
contractor uses CSR as an instrument of governance to define and legitimise the perimeter of 
its responsibility over the whole network of subcontractors. This responsibility, which is quite 
distinct from legal liability (since the prime contractor is not the owner of the subcontracting 
firms), favours the emergence of shared norms and procedures, notably through regular 
evaluations of the social and environmental responsibility of the subcontractors. By defining 
the obligations related to the network, the institutionalisation of CSR leads to the construction 
of “contracto-organisational responsibility law” (Teubner, 1993). CSR practices thus form 
part of “a system intended to regulate the managerial scope of a company that has lost its 
economic and social unity” (Dupuis, 2008: 68 [our translation]). Moreover, the use of codes 
of conduct and systems of alert within global value chains plays a role in the establishment of 
rules and obligations imposed on subcontractors by the prime contracting firms (Palpacuer et 
al., 2009). Lastly, the CSR policies followed in the prime contracting firms can heighten their 
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reputation in the eyes of the subcontractors, who will as a result be more willing to invest in 
specific assets without fear of hold-up (Klein et al., 1978). 
The role of CSR in the realm of corporate governance also concerns relations within 
the firm. While the model of shareholder governance suffers from the problem of the 
appropriation of all the firm’s assets, and in particular the human capital, CSR also provides 
the means to regulate the balance of power between employees with co-specific human 
capital. Strict application of property rights cannot protect shareholders from the sort of 
setbacks experienced, for example, by the British advertising agency Saatchi & Saatchi 
(Rajan and Zingales, 2000). In 1994, Maurice Saatchi, the talented chairman of Saatchi & 
Saatchi, asked for a particularly generous stock option plan. The American investment funds 
that controlled 30% of the capital refused this request, on the grounds that Saatchi & Saatchi 
shares had failed to reach the expected levels for several years. This led to the departure of the 
Saatchi brothers, accompanied by forty other key senior executives. They set up a new 
company, M&C Saatchi, which, by attracting some of Saatchi & Saatchi’s most important 
clients, rapidly devalued the assets of the original company. According to Zingales (2000), the 
disciplinary role of shareholder governance would have been effective in a “traditional firm”, 
whose boundaries are determined by the ownership of its physical assets, but is no longer 
functional in the “new firm”, where “human capital has become essential” and “contracts are 
highly incomplete” (ibid.: 1645). The shareholders thought that with their 30% of voting 
rights they could control the strategy of the firm by exercising alienable residual rights of 
control, along the lines of the incomplete contracts theory of the firm. They believed that they 
could best further their interests by refusing Maurice Saatchi the reward he had asked for, 
whereas they should, on the contrary, have transcended their legal prerogatives to create the 
productive and relational complementarities essential to the long-term future and growth of 
the firm. In that way they would have acquired additional power, based on their ability to 
stabilise the individuals in the company. But by abandoning these functions to the profit of the 
managers (namely Maurice Saatchi and his collaborators), they also lost the fundamental 
power to protect their interests. It is precisely these failures of shareholder governance that 
CSR can remedy by enhancing staff loyalty, by reaffirming the hierarchical relation and the 
property rights of the firm. This is demonstrated in the study by Béthoux et al. (2007) of a 
corpus of codes of conduct drawn from 166 multinational companies in various sectors of 
activities. The interest of these documents is that they are the most faithful representation of 
business attitudes to CSR (because they nearly all come from the companies themselves, 
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rather than an outside organism of certification that would have standardised their contents). 
By conducting a lexical analysis without any a priori categorisation, Béthoux et al. (2007) 
identify the sequences of words that appear most often in the corpus. They show that the 
codes are less concerned with the environment than they are with labour, which is certainly 
dealt with from the perspective of workers’ rights (often with reference, more or less 
complete, to the standards of the International Labour Organisation), but also with ceaseless 
affirmations of the hierarchical relation and the firm’s property rights over intangible assets. 
The hierarchical relation is highlighted in the definition of procedures to be followed 
by the employee in the event of violation of the code of conduct or the law, and in the 
prevention of risks by the managerial team which “monitors”, “inspects”, “evaluates”, etc. 
The codes also stipulate the advantages enjoyed by employees in the performance of their 
function: they must be occasional and of modest value (“meals”, “entertainment”, etc.) and 
must not place the employee in a position of obligation towards any member of another 
organisation, which might create a conflict of interest between the firm and its employee. 
Companies also use the code of conduct to affirm the necessary confidentiality of information 
(which may serve as a justification for controlling the external communications of the 
employees), but above all its property rights over that information and over the intellectual 
production of the employees, as testified by Compaq’s code of conduct (2001): “To the extent 
permitted under applicable law, employees shall assign to the company any invention, work 
of authorship, composition of other form of intellectual property created during the period of 
employment” (quoted by Béthoux et al., 2007: 87). Within a framework that appears to be 
one of partnership – as Gond and Mercier (2005) show, the dominant model of reference for 
CSR is the stakeholder model –, the company actually underlines its own legitimacy to 
appropriate the intellectual production of its highly qualified employees and the tangible 
wealth created by the co-specialisation in human capital. 
This view of CSR as an (often informal) instrument for the regulation of relations 
between employer and employees or between prime contractor and subcontractors deserves 
further clarification, by examining its application in a sector that is emblematic of the 
phenomenon. We shall therefore study the French telecommunications industry, as a means to 
obtain empirical evidence of the need for operators to use CSR for purposes of corporate 
governance. 
 
2. Corporate governance and CSR: the case of the French telecommunications industry 
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Although the telecommunications industry is the oldest of the information and 
communication technologies (Musso, 2008), the operators that make up this sector 
nevertheless have all the attributes of the “new” firm. Firstly, they need their employees to 
invest continuously and specifically in human capital, because of the high technological 
content of the services supplied, the sustained research effort required and the complex nature 
of the markets in which they operate, as Ferrary (2002) observed in his study of the 
telecommunications sector. Secondly, apart from the nature of the activity and of the 
production tool used, the specificity of human capital also depends on the social environment 
with which the employees interact (Ferrary, 1999) and therefore on whether or not there exists 
an internal labour market (Doeringer and Piore, 1971). In this context, an internal labour 
market among the operators, ensuring a certain level of employment stability, guarantees 
specific and lasting commitments between employees and employers. Employees with stable 
jobs are more likely to align their interests with the organisational objective and to adopt the 
cooperative behaviour of collective value creation. For their part, the employers ensure an 
efficient allocation of human resources based on a rationale of making specific human capital 
profitable. In this perspective, investment in specific training limits the transferability of 
human capital, and counteracts its depreciation, thereby increasing the marginal productivity 
of the employees within the company. In practice, the spending of French telecom operators 
on non-transferable training has been very high: in 2009 the three dominant operators invested 
about 6% of the wage bill on in-service training, compared to an average of 2.9%9
                                                          
9 However, this average effort goes well beyond the legal obligations of French companies. Article L. 951-1 of 
the Labour Code stipulates, since 1st January 2004, that companies with more than ten employees must dedicate 
a sum equal to no less than 1.6% of their annual wage bill to the financing of actions defined in article L. 950-1. 
This investment is devoted to the funding of continuous professional training, in priority of a nature to develop 
the specific character of the employees’ human capital, notably with programmes of adaptation and development 
of their skills. The object of these programmes is to improve the fitness of employees to the posts they occupy 
and to their evolution and to help them to remain in employment. Continuous training can also involve the 
acquisition, maintenance or perfecting of knowledge. Along the same lines, actions of promotion, intended to 
allow employees to acquire higher qualifications, contribute to the specific training of the employee when the 
promotion aimed for is within the company. 
 for all 
French companies (Dares, 2011). Secondly, telecom operators have followed the general 
trend of refocusing on core business, although the influence of the big, leading firms in 
shaping the organisation of their markets remains as strong as ever (Brusoni et al., 2001), 
because of the high capital intensity of the sector (entry barriers). This refocusing strategy is 
implemented notably through the wide use of industrial and commercial subcontracting, based 
on a rationale of flexible specialisation. It is emblematic of firms in growth industries, but 
continues to be pursued during the stage of maturity (Stigler, 1951; Paulré, 2000), which is in 
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particular the case for the telecommunications industry in France (OCDE, 2010). In reality, 
growth in the size of the market is accompanied by a deepening in the division of labour 
between firms, and therefore favours the specialisation of organisations throughout the value 
chain. 
The telecommunications sector is dominated by two main types of players. Firstly, the 
network equipment manufacturers act as subcontractors. They develop the technologies and 
manufacture the physical components, software and terminals needed by the operators. Then, 
further downstream, the operators supply network-based services. For a long time, they 
enjoyed a situation of monopoly in national markets. This was the case for France Télécom-
Orange, the historic operator in France. But the situation changed at the end of the 1990s, with 
the movement of deregulation, and the sector is now composed of four integrated operators10. 
The leader in France is still France Télécom-Orange, an international group with 180,000 
employees (of whom 100,000 work in France) and turnover in France of nearly 25 billion 
euros in 2010. Second comes the Société Française de Radiotéléphonie (SFR), created in 1987 
by the Compagnie Générale des Eaux, which presently employs about 10,000 people in 
France and had turnover of more than 12 billion euros in 2010. The first private operator to 
provide an alternative to France Télécom-Orange, the SFR Group11
                                                          
10 In France, since 2005, the “general public” telecommunications offers have been “integrated”, meaning that 
the operators propose a package of services comprising fixed and mobile telephony, Internet and television all at 
the same time. And since 2006, Orange has been the unique France Télécom brand for Internet, television and 
mobile telephony in France. 
 is considered the 
technological pioneer in mobile telephony and in deregulated fixed telephony. In 1994, a third 
operator obtained a mobile telephony licence: Bouygues Telecom, a subsidiary of the French 
group Bouygues, now the third biggest telecom operator in France with nearly 9,000 
employees and turnover of about 5.5 billion euros for 2010. Bouygues Telecom entered the 
market with the aim of revolutionising the mobile telephony market through a strategy of 
differentiation, in particular with attractive prices aimed at students and low-income 
populations. However, that was without counting on the arrival of Free, a subsidiary of the 
French telecommunications group Iliad, which, after successfully penetrating the Internet 
access market in 1999, obtained the fourth, 3G mobile telephony license in 2009. This 
outsider aims to energise the flagging, oligopolistic market of French telecommunications by 
bringing innovation without any extra cost to the consumers. 
11 The SFR Group resulted from the merger, in spring 2005, of the Cegetel subsidiary of the SFR-Cegetel group 
and Neuf Telecom, which became Neuf Cegetel. 
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Bearing in mind the relative positioning of these four competitors, it will be useful to 
observe their past and planned future actions in the sphere of CSR. We shall do so by means 
of a comparative case study. Thus, through analysis of the official documents of the four 
operators and a series of face-to-face interviews conducted between November 2010 and 
January 2011, we show the extent to which these companies seek, each in its own way, to use 
CSR as an instrument of governance, in the management of employment relations and/or 
subcontracting relations. 
 
 
2.1. CSR in French telecommunications operators 
The official documents and interviews illustrate the way each company communicates 
its particular approach to CSR. Broadly speaking, these communications must be 
distinguished from actual practices, if only because some firms are guilty of 
“greenwashing”12
                                                          
12 This term was defined by Greenpeace as “the act of deceiving consumers about the environmental practices of 
a company or the environmental benefits of a product or service.” The concept of greenwashing could also be 
extended to include social practices (Bazillier and Vaudier, 2009). 
, expressing laudable views on the environment without seeking to make 
any real impact. In that case, why have we chosen to study the communications when we wish 
to identify the practices? Firstly, because the extent of those practices is defined by the firm 
itself, which determines, on a voluntary basis, the profile of its own specific CSR. So, even if 
it were possible to verify, point by point, the affirmations contained in the official documents, 
it would still be necessary to take the company’s communications as point of departure, 
because they are the only explicit statement of the company’s conception of CSR. Secondly, 
because some of the elements set out in the official documents and interviews have been 
verified (compliance with norms, certification by an external auditing firm, etc.): they are no 
longer of a uniquely declarative nature. Lastly and above all because the role played by CSR 
in the domain of corporate governance – the dimension addressed in this article – does not 
have the sort of positive impact on the firm’s image that an environmental action, for 
example, might have. It could, on the contrary, be damaging, for example when the firm 
records, in the official documents relating to CSR, that it is the sole owner of certain assets or 
that its employees do not have the right to receive gifts, or when it turns out that some of its 
15 
subcontractors’ practices are reprehensible13. As this instrumental dimension of CSR is not an 
element to be exploited solely on the level of communication - far from it -, its presence in the 
official reports testifies to veritable concerns of the firm in terms of corporate governance. It 
is therefore on this dimension that we shall focus in our analysis of the interviews14 and 
official documents15
2.1.1 France Télécom-Orange 
, based on the hypothesis that they provide a good indication of the 
practices of the telecom operators studied. 
If telecom operators are frequently criticised for their behaviour towards consumers 
(high prices, difficulty in changing from one operator to another, lack of transparency in their 
supply, etc.), the historic operator suffers more specifically from a deplorable image due to 
the wave of suicides reported in the media since 2009. “The social crisis that developed in 
2009 at France Télécom-Orange was the result of a total loss of trust among the 
employees”, explained Marc Fossier, executive manager of CSR at France Télécom-Orange. 
In a situation where the Human Resources Department is mistrusted, the social debate is now 
followed by teams from CSR Management, specially created in 2009. A vast survey of 
stress16
                                                          
13 Leading a totally disintegrated firm like Apple, for example, to guard against this risk by publishing, each 
year, the failures of its own network in terms of child labour, excessive working hours, etc. (see Apple Supplier 
Responsibility 2011 Report, http://www.apple.com/supplierresponsibility/). 
 has been launched and CSR Management has drawn up a plan of action to improve 
working conditions in the group, with the emphasis on the development of skills, the 
management of stress at work, professional gender equality and the strengthening of social 
dialogue (see Responsabilité sociale des entreprises, Rapport détaillé, France Télécom 2009: 
32-33). In particular, the group undertakes to “recognise and accompany its employees by 
attaching primary importance to the human dimension and notably by empowering 
employees” (ibid. 13). Along the same lines, a New Social Contract, with a budget of 900 
million euros, was adopted in September 2010 for all the group’s employees in France. It 
“expresses our conviction that social performance and economic performance are inseparable, 
14 We were received on 30 November 2010 by Laurent Guidat, head of Sustainable Development Projects at 
Bouygues Telecom (Issy-les-Moulineaux, Hauts-de-Seine), by Valérie Prat, manager of the CSR Coordination 
Department at SFR (La Défense-Paris) and on 20 January 2011 by Marc Fossier, executive manager of CSR at 
France Télécom-Orange (Paris, 15ème). 
15 For reasons of clarity, extracts from interviews are printed in italics and inverted commas, while those drawn 
from official documents are only in inverted commas. We have underlined the most significant quotations. All 
quotations have been translated from the French. 
16 All 102,000 French employees were questioned by means of a questionnaire (response rate: 80%) by the 
independent consulting firm Technologia, which then conducted about 1000 individual interviews to produce a 
more detailed diagnosis. This aspect of CSR was verified by Deloitte, the auditor of France Télécom. See 
Responsabilité sociale des entreprises, Rapport détaillé, France Télécom 2009, p. 24. 
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at the service of the customers and for the benefit of everyone”17. In particular, monitoring of 
the social performance of the company, with an impact on the variable pay of the senior 
executives18
The base of CSR at France Télécom-Orange is laid down in the group’s Charter of 
deontology, which “serves as a guide to professional conduct for the whole group. […] 
Blatant infringement of these values and principles, contrary to the interests of the group, may 
incur disciplinary action. The nature and severity of disciplinary action is specified in the 
internal regulations governing each entity” (Charte de déontologie du groupe France 
Télécom: 13). The charter recalls that all France Télécom-Orange employees must ensure 
“respect of the principles of loyalty, integrity and impartiality in [their] relations with 
customers and suppliers”, refrain from “soliciting gifts or advantages or accepting gifts of 
significant value”, see to the “protection and respect of the intellectual property and all the 
projects and know-how of any nature in the group”, see to “the appropriate use of the group’s 
resources and the conservation of its assets” and if they have access, in a professional capacity 
or by chance, to confidential information, they must take “every useful precaution to preserve 
that confidentiality”, including after they leave the group (p. 11). 
, has just been introduced. In this way, France Télécom-Orange shows a desire to 
make CSR a real factor of competitiveness, rather than a simple operation of communication. 
This strategy is even deployed in the structures of governance, as Marc Fossier pointed out: 
“The Board of Administration has even decided to adapt its organisation and to transform the 
Committee of selection, pay and governance into a Committee of governance and corporate 
social responsibility” and “the group’s CSR organisation has been strengthened by the 
nomination of CSR sponsors at the highest levels of each entity (CEO or vice-CEO) to give 
greater credibility to actions involving CSR”. In addition, this strategy complies with 
prevailing laws and regulations in the realm of corporate governance, including the American 
Sarbanes-Oxley Law and Financial Security Law, the principles of which are the security of 
information, personal health and safety and environmental protection. 
Furthermore, the Document de référence France Télécom 2009 (annual financial 
report), which addresses the various operational risks that might affect the activity also 
stresses the group’s concern to “make its CSR a priority” (p. 31). “The social – or societal – 
responsibility of the company must become an intrinsic and omnipresent component” (p. 32). 
                                                          
17 France Télécom-Orange press release, 21 September 2010. 
18 Evaluation of the social performance is based partly on social indicators drawn from the accounts and partly 
from an anonymous survey of the group’s employees. It accounts for about 8% of the variable pay of the 800 
senior executives of France Télécom-Orange, which itself constitutes between 30 and 50% of their total pay 
(figures given by Marc Fossier). 
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The analysis, in terms of risks, points in particular to the risks related to human resources 
following the wave of suicides in 2009 and those concerning the subcontractors. As regards 
the latter, France Télécom-Orange introduced its own supplier screening tool (QREDIC®) in 
2004. This includes a criterion to evaluate the respect of commitments in terms of business 
ethics, the environment and societal responsibility. The measurements made are used for the 
selection of suppliers and/or to implement a plan of improvement, established jointly by the 
supplier concerned and France Télécom. Since 2009, the group also commissions social 
audits in Asia, based on the international standard SA 800019 (an audit in China in 2009 
certified by Deloitte) and cooperates with Deutsche Telekom and Telecom Italia to pool the 
CSR audits of Asian suppliers (see Responsabilité sociale des entreprises, Rapport détaillé, 
France Télécom 2009: 48-49). Lastly, through the FFT (Fédération Française des 
Télécommunications) agreement of July 2010, France Télécom-Orange shares with SFR and 
Bouygues Telecom the tool EcoVadis20
“The primary objective of CSR in the France Télécom-Orange group is the creation of 
value for all concerned: shareholders, employers, customers, suppliers, civil society”, affirms 
Marc Fossier, in substance. However, there may be trade-off problems between the different 
sub-objectives, even within the company itself: this is the case, for example, with the two-year 
phone replacement programme, which is a winning strategy from the commercial point of 
view (customer loyalty) but not from an environmental perspective (many mobile phones in 
good condition are then left unused, in the bottom of drawers) or with the raising of customer 
exit barriers, a strategy that can be justified commercially even while the CSR management 
points its dangers (long-term inefficiency, or the propagation of a negative image in the 
customer’s circle of influence). In this respect, France Télécom-Orange has adopted the 
principle of materiality, which consists in making trade-offs between the different interests of 
the stakeholders and organising the CSR priorities into a hierarchy
, developed by the company of the same name, in the 
form of an on-line platform of evaluation of the CSR performance of subcontractors. 
21
                                                          
19 The SA 8000 (Social Accountability 8000 Standard) was developed by the NGO Social Accountability 
International (SAI). 
. One might reasonably 
20 EcoVadis is an external tool for the evaluation of the CSR performance of subcontractors based on a very 
precise questionnaire, since it processes suppliers in terms of purchasing categories (more than 150 categories 
are covered). The advantage of this tool is that it is pooled and available on-line (accessible with a log-in and 
password). Each department can therefore complete its own section of the questionnaire, resulting in high 
response rates. 
21 Based on the three principles of the norm AA1000APS (in accordance with the Grenelle 2 law) published in 
2008 by the non-profit network AccountAbility, a CSR standard also used as a basis for evaluation by the 
external auditors. These three principles are inclusivity, which consists in identifying the expectations of the 
relevant stakeholders to determine the issues of CSR, materiality, which consists in trading off between the 
expectations and prioritising the risks in order to select the most significant CSR issues and responsiveness, 
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expect this principle to be favourable to the strengthening of an instrumental CSR at the 
service of a collective alignment of the stakeholders’ interests on those of the company. 
 
 
2.1.2. SFR 
Historically, SFR’s approach to CSR developed primarily at the end of the 1990s 
around the issue of the installation of cell phone towers and their impact on health and the 
environment. In this respect, the aim, according to Valérie Prat, was to define a guide to 
relations between the Association Française des Opérateurs Mobiles (French Mobile 
Operators Association - AFOM) and the Association des Maires de France (Association of 
French Mayors - AMF). Initially perceived as a constraint, this issue was quickly turned into a 
strategic opportunity: CSR would improve the group’s performance22. Valérie Prat summed 
up this change in rationale as follows: “Now, the idea is to do CSR to make a profit in a 
mature company”. Thus, for example, the dematerialization of energy-hungry data centres is 
also a way of reducing costs, and a CSR-oriented commercial strategy attracts23 and/or 
strengthens the loyalty24 of customers and allows to forestall a certain number of risks 
(involving reputation, purchasing, etc.). In other words, “CSR must be taken into account in 
every one of the company’s decisions”. That is, notably, the reason why the group set up a 
transversal organisation in 2008 dedicated to CSR, the members of which are attached to the 
highest echelons of each department, to improve the coordination of environmental and social 
actions, some of which had already been in progress for ten years or so, but in an isolated 
manner and with a “health and environment” orientation. At the same time, CSR serves as a 
tool to regulate the power relations within the group. More precisely, according to Valérie 
Prat, “CSR must be put into the ADN of every employee25
                                                                                                                                                                                     
which gives rise to the drafting of action plans that are reviewed each year (see Responsabilité sociale des 
entreprises, Rapport détaillé, France Télécom 2009, pp. 12-13). 
, because it is a powerful lever for 
adhesion; there is no problem in motivating employees on these issues. This gives added 
22 In 2003, for example, SFR was the first operator to introduce a voluntary recycling programme for old mobile 
phones, aiming to improve economic and ecological performance. 
23 “At equal quality and price, customers prefer to buy from the company that does the most CSR. This 
preference for the most socially responsible brand is the second criterion of choice after value for money”, states 
Valérie Prat. 
24 For example, the “éco-avantage” option (choosing to keep one’s old phone when the contract gives one the 
right to replace it, and benefiting from a reduction in the monthly bill instead) helps to reduce the consumption 
of cell phones and prolongs their useful life. 
25 This can be achieved through a number of initiatives such as the funding by SFR of citizen action days, 
solidarity leave or raising the awareness of employees about the management of paper and its recycling. 
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meaning to work; it increases the pride of belonging. It is a real in-house strategy relayed by 
strong communication”. 
If communication on CSR is strong within the group, it is also strong towards the 
outside world. The group’s line of conduct is set out in three official documents: chief among 
these is the Code d’éthique et d’engagements (“code of ethics and commitments”), the main 
elements of which are also presented in the Cahier Développement Durable 2009 (“2009 
sustainable development report”) and the Rapport d’activité et de développement durable 
2009 (“2009 activity and sustainable development report”). Three of the seven guiding 
principles of the Code d’éthique et d’engagement actually consist in reaffirming the interest of 
the company and defining the limits of its property rights. The first of these three principles 
draws the profile of a corporate governance based on the primacy of collective interest; it 
consists in “avoiding situations of personal conflict of interest, which would or might be 
against the interests of the company”. The two other guiding principles concern the security of 
information and human resources of the company, since they involve “protecting information 
concerning the company, its customers, projects, offers and products and managing this 
confidentiality in accordance with internal company procedures” and “protecting the goods 
and resources of the company” (pp. 2-3). These principles lead to a series of underlying 
“objectives”, themselves associated with “SFR commitments”, aiming notably to “remind all 
employees of the group that it is forbidden to access all protected, nominative information and 
data outside the strict frame of their professional mission” or to “raise the awareness of all 
employees and inform the principal managers of the SFR group about the formal ban on using 
privileged or confidential information to which they may have access, to carry out or enable, 
directly or through a third party, an operation forbidden by law on a regulated market or to act 
in such a way for their personal profit or that of a third party, or more generally for 
speculative purposes” (pp. 5-7). The security of the information and resources of the company 
must, by virtue of the first principle of the above-mentioned Code, benefit all the 
stakeholders, within a logic of collective governance. To this purpose, SFR undertakes to 
“encourage the development of professional skills through appropriate training programmes, 
reconciling the needs of the company and the personal prospects of the employees”, to “carry 
out an evaluation of skills and performances by means of professional assessments, at least 
once a year, taking care to put into perspective the potential career prospects of each 
employee”, to “inform employees of the career possibilities and opportunities within the SFR 
group by means of dedicated communication tools, emphasising in-house advancement 
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whenever possible” and, lastly, to “encourage managers to develop a good working 
atmosphere, notably through mutual respect, recognition of the right to make mistakes, 
promotion of team spirit and regular information of employees” (p. 6). The security of 
information and resources is also the purpose of a warning from the group about corrupt 
practices, banning “any payment or advantage of whatever nature, or any gift of more than 
symbolic value, given by a third party involved in business relations with the SFR group or 
given by an employee to a third party involved in business relations with the SFR group” (p. 
9). 
The same Code extends the concerns of the SFR group in the domain of CSR to its 
relations with suppliers. The objectives are to “select industrial and commercial partners 
capable of providing the necessary guarantees concerning their commitment, in each country 
where they operate, to respect the fundamental social rights defined, notably, by the 
International Labour Organisation” and to “see to the mutual respect of the principles of 
loyalty” (p. 8), conveyed in particular by SFR’s promise to “respect and ensure that our 
employees respect the rules relating to competition and subcontracting” and to “respect and 
ensure that our employees respect industrial, intellectual or artistic property rights”. The 
Cahier Développement Durable 2009 adds a degree of evaluation to these commitments; it 
records the existence of “sustainable development evaluation of fifty suppliers and six 
purchasing categories” and of “the inclusion of a CSR paragraph in consultations” (p. 11). In 
this respect, like France Télécom-Orange, SFR is signatory to the FTT of July 2010, which 
pools the evaluation of CSR performances of the telecom operators’ subcontractors through a 
dedicated on-line platform developed by the company EcoVadis. As a result, “SFR has 
received ISO 14001 certification for its environmental management”, summarises Valérie 
Prat. 
2.1.3. Bouygues Telecom 
The CSR concerns of Bouygues Telecom emerged towards the end of 2002, in a 
context where environmental problems were starting to be perceived as fundamental, leading 
to the creation of a centralised “Environment” structure, which was subsequently developed 
into a “Sustainable Development” department. In April 2003, Martin Bouygues, CEO of the 
Bouygues group, accelerated the process of commitment of subsidiaries to CSR through their 
adhesion to the UN’s Global Compact26
                                                          
26 Initiated at the World Economic Forum in January 2000, the United Nations Global Compact promotes ten 
universally accepted principles in the areas of the environment, human rights, labour and anti-corruption. 
. 
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Led by the “Innovation Architecture Services” department, working in synergy with 
the functional and operational entities, CSR has rapidly become an instrument of work 
motivation for employees, supported by strong internal communication27. “Today, CSR is an 
important element in the eyes of our employees, since more than 90% declare that they work 
in a responsible company and are proud of that fact. The level of stress, measured during the 
annual medical check-up, is low (little organised competition between employees, etc.)”, 
affirms Laurent Guidat. The Rapport Développement Durable 2009 (“2009 sustainable 
development report”), in which Bouygues Telecom explains its environmental, social and 
societal commitments (which are not dealt with in the activity report), confirms his statement: 
“95% of employees declare that they are proud to work here, and for 95% of them, Bouygues 
Telecom is a public-spirited company”. These results have improved since the 2006 survey. 
The company even obtained, for the third year running, the “Best Workplaces” label from the 
Great Place to Work institute, which evaluates employee satisfaction through a questionnaire 
sent to a random selection of them. Among the strong points of the company, “the fairness of 
treatment, whatever handicap one might have” (97% of positive responses), the “pride of 
belonging” (89%) and the question “Overall, I would say that it is really a company to work 
for”, which received 88% of positive responses. According to Laurent Guidat, on the Issy-les-
Moulineaux site, these favourable working conditions are based on a set of measures to 
strengthen employee loyalty, ranging from personal services (laundry, child care allowance, 
etc.) to leisure activities (sports hall, sauna, the funding of relaxing workshops such as 
gastronomy, painting, etc.) proposed in a HQE-certified (High Environmental Quality) 
building28. They are also accompanied by formal and informal mechanisms of support to the 
employees: “total training expenditure represents 6% of the company’s wage bill29
                                                          
27 All Bouygues Telecom employees are informed of the objectives, actions and results of CSR via intranet 
(news threads, interviews, sustainable development pages, etc.), have an access to official documents and a 
“sustainable development week” organised each year. External communication on CSR is weaker, “too limited,” 
according to Laurent Guidat, “whereas activism is strong”. 
, and this 
has reduced the mobility of workers between the different operators, which had been very 
high in the early 2000s. […] Martin Bouygues manifests a clear desire to accompany his 
employees, to retain them and favour their advancement. So a very substantial supply of jobs 
exists, to provide employees with career opportunities”. Other incentives have been 
28 The environmental impact of the building is reduced in particular by a system of rainwater recycling for the 
toilets and gardens, solar panels for the heating and the two restaurants which recycle cooking oils to feed 
succulent plants. 
29 Article L. 951-1 of the Labour Code stipulates, since 1st January 2004, that companies with more than ten 
employees must dedicate a sum equal to no less than 1.6% of their annual wage bill to the financing of actions 
defined in article  L. 950-1.. 
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introduced, including profit-sharing (1½ months’ wages, on average), a company-funded 
savings plan and an attractive works committee. If the security of human assets is a declared 
priority of Bouygues Télécom’s CSR, it should be noted that, unlike its competitors, the 
security of data is not. It is only mentioned in the confidentiality clauses of employment 
contracts. 
In 2004, to fully respect the principles of the UN’s Global Compact, Bouygues 
Telecom had to convince its strategic suppliers (and therefore their own partners over the 
whole logistics chain) also to adopt them. This raised certain problems, particularly for small 
firms said to present “social risks” (such as certain suppliers of accessories manufactured in 
China) who needed to be accompanied in this transition. Initially, “the idea was to make the 
social audit of these suppliers a “win-win” approach: this involved Bouygues Telecom 
financing part of the move to compliance of the suppliers, who could, in return, exploit the 
charter of ethics for competitive advantage”. The results of the first audits were catastrophic, 
but the constructive attitude adopted by Bouygues Telecom subsequently proved to be 
effective: “most of the factories have made progress, allowing us to avoid breaking off 
relations with the most important subcontractors”. This same concern to monitor 
subcontractors led Bouygues Telecom to sign the FFT agreement in July 2010: Bouygues 
Telecom therefore shares, with France Télécom-Orange and SFR, the same EcoVadis tool for 
the CSR assessment of subcontractors. 
2.1.4. Free 
Free, like its parent company Iliad, does not communicate on CSR. Nor is this 
operator a signatory to the FFT agreement concerning the responsibility of its members in 
terms of the environment, solidarity, employment or the contribution of information and 
communication technologies to economic development through a set of missions including 
the drafting of a charter of commitments relating to sustainable development or the definition 
of a plan of concrete actions in this sphere. Let us simply note the existence of the Fondation 
Free, destined to finance projects on the digital divide and free software. 
 
2.2. An identical instrument for regulating employment and subcontracting relations  
Close study of the official documents and interviews shows the importance of CSR in 
the governance of telecom operators (with the exception of the newcomer Free). In this area, 
France Télécom-Orange, SFR and Bouygues Telecom have all developed, to varying degrees, 
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practices of providing incentives, developing loyalty and enhancing the critical resources of 
their collaborators. More precisely, our study brings to light a strong desire to secure the 
specific human capital of employees and external partners, based on a rationale of ex post co-
specialisation of critical resources. Firstly, this means strengthening the feeling among the 
team members (employees, industrial and commercial partners) of belonging to a clan and 
therefore of putting the collective interest above individual interests, through the 
implementation of formal incentive mechanisms (regular hierarchical evaluation of employees 
or monitoring of the social and environmental performance of industrial and commercial 
partners). Secondly, it involves the use of informal mechanisms of coordination with the aim 
of the long-term retention and development of the resources of the key partners of the 
company. 
In the domain of formal practices, SFR undertakes, for example, to “carry out an 
evaluation of skills and performances by means of professional assessments, at least once a 
year, taking care to put into perspective the potential career prospects of each employee”. 
Furthermore, the three operators assess the CSR performance of their subcontractors with the 
tool EcoVadis, to which each one adds their own specific devices. These disciplinary tools 
have the same objectives as the employee incentive mechanisms: they are systems for 
monitoring the firm’s key partners, owners of critical resources, in order not only to ensure 
they do not have reprehensible practices (e.g. child labour), but also to better control the 
quality of the products supplied, even though there is no hierarchical link between the prime 
contractor firm and the subcontractor. At the same time, to ensure long-term value-creating 
relations, the operators set up specific training programmes to enhance the value of the 
specific human capital to which they have access. Thus, France Télécom-Orange has based its 
project to the year 2015 on its main strengths, including its “innovation capacity” and its 
“desire to give employees the best possible training”, and SFR wishes to “encourage the 
development of professional skills through well-adapted training programmes, reconciling the 
needs of the company with the personal prospects of our employees”. To build long-term 
relations and get the most out of the critical resources of the company, this same operator 
seeks to “inform employees of the career possibilities and opportunities within the SFR group 
by means of dedicated communication tools, emphasising in-house advancement whenever 
possible”. 
As for informal practices, Valérie Prat of SFR describes “the powerful lever for 
adhesion” that CSR represents and Laurent Guidat of Bouygues Telecom highlights the 
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importance of CSR in the eyes of employees. As for the France Télécom-Orange Reference 
Document 2009, it makes CSR a priority as an “intrinsic and omnipresent component” to 
guarantee and enhance the value of labour relations within the group, based on a rationale of 
respect for the principles of loyalty, integrity and impartiality. SFR focuses on the 
development of a “good working atmosphere, notably through mutual respect, recognition of 
the right to make mistakes, promotion of team spirit […]”, which is intended to efficiently co-
specialise the human capital of the workers through reciprocal learning. The company applies 
the same principles of promoting long-term relations with its external partners, by ensuring 
“the mutual respect of principles of loyalty in all relations with industrial and commercial 
partners”. Bouygues Telecom promotes the intrinsic motivation of its employees, since 95% 
of them declare that they are proud to work there, and the same percentage considers 
Bouygues Telecom to be a public-spirited company. In sum, the innovative practices of labour 
organisation and the processes of collective participation involve the partners voluntarily in a 
dynamic of reorganisation of powers within the company. Ultimately, beyond the legal 
protection of data and goods and the explicit coordination of the human assets of the 
company, the governance of French telecom operators is exercised through the informal 
instruments of CSR and directed at all the fundamental stakeholders of the company. 
What is striking here is the way that CSR is explicitly used for purposes of corporate 
governance, both in internal relations and in subcontracting relations, with the conviction that 
“social performance and economic performance are inseparable” (France Télécom-Orange) 
and that it is possible “to do CSR to make a profit” (V. Prat, SFR). Nevertheless, and contrary 
to the frequently expressed idea that all firms do the same thing in terms of CSR, because it is 
simply a matter of communication, our study shows that they differ on certain points. This is 
because as a tool of governance, CSR is adapted to address the specific problems of each 
firm. Between France Télécom-Orange, the historic operator with 180,000 employees, of 
whom 100,000 work in France (and two-thirds of whom are civil servants), having to deal 
with an unprecedented wave of suicides, and Bouygues Telecom, subsidiary of the Bouygues 
group, which only has 9,000 employees, with an average age of 3330
                                                          
30 See Usine nouvelle, 24 April 2008. 
, the problems of 
governance are clearly not the same. And the response to these problems also differs: France 
Télécom-Orange uses CSR to solve the social crisis that the human resources department 
failed to either foresee or deal with, while Bouygues Telecom motivates its employees by 
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providing them with a wide variety of services that strengthen the idea of a young company 
for whom it is good to work. 
Another remarkable finding is the relative similarity between these operators’ 
treatment of intra- and inter-firm relations. This echoes a certain number of recent empirical 
works focusing on the operational approach to the governance of specific human capital-
intensive firms. This is notably the case for the econometric study by Rajan and Wulf (2003), 
which, on a panel of more than 300 listed American companies in the industrial sector 
between 1986 and 1999, provides evidence of the similarities between the governance model 
of the “flattening firm” and that of inter-firm relations under the growing influence of specific 
human capital. More precisely, the transition from companies with important stocks of 
physical capital to firms intensive in specific human capital has influenced the 
horizontalization of forms of labour organisation and the evolution of corporate governance 
that brings into play more tools of an economic (i.e., formal) nature and of a relational (i.e., 
informal) nature. Along the same lines, Hoetker and Mellewigt (2004) show that the 
governance of alliances established among 83 German firms in the telecommunications 
industry in 2001 is based on a combination of contractual (i.e., formal) mechanisms (control, 
incentive) and relational (i.e., informal) mechanisms (information sharing, relations of trust 
and cooperation). In particular, the study demonstrates that the presence of human assets 
favours the establishment of relational practices of corporate governance and contractual 
mechanisms, if these assets are specific in nature, bearing in mind that the intensive 
application of contractual mechanisms significantly increases the probability that the 
relational mechanisms will be effective, and vice versa. Ultimately, it appears that the 
centrality of firm-specific human capital favours the combined use of formal and informal 
governance tools within the framework of the economic boundaries of the firm, along the 
same lines as the works of Poppo and Zenger (2002). Moreover, the results of the network of 
partners are also largely dependent on the implementation of innovative informal 
mechanisms, which belong at least partly in the domain of CSR. 
Conclusion 
The “new firm”, which is vertically disintegrated and intensive in specific human 
capital, combines a number of productive complementarities through the regulation of access 
to critical resources. This conception of the firm, of which the most extreme form is the 
modular organisation, calls for a rethinking of corporate governance, not only in terms of its 
mode of wealth distribution but also in terms of its capacity of wealth creation. The incentive 
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and control mechanisms of the shareholder model are insufficient to ensure the necessary 
investment in specific human assets and co-specialisation of suppliers of critical resources 
that are so vital to the efficient production of the final product. 
Our theory is that companies use CSR to remedy the shortcomings of shareholder 
governance, and this is corroborated by the results of our study of the telecom operators 
sector. Analysis of the official documents and interviews shows that companies introduce 
formal and informal mechanisms based on partnership and considered as complementary 
rather than substitutable to the shareholder model of corporate governance. In this respect, 
CSR has two distinct purposes: firstly to guarantee the long-term viability of relations with 
the network of subcontractors, and secondly to strengthen the loyalty of employees, enhance 
their productive resources, and solve some of the problems related to the inalienable character 
of certain assets, primarily human, which nevertheless contribute to the long-term 
development of the company. 
This symmetry between the treatment of inter-firm and intra-firm relations is striking, 
as are certain similarities that we have observed in the ways that the different operators use 
CSR. However, this should not lead us to neglect the differences, which support our 
hypothesis of the strategic use of CSR for purposes of governance. Between the historic 
operator, facing a disturbing series of work-related suicides and declaring its desire to 
“become the leading telecom operator in the field of CSR by 2012”, and Bouygues Telecom, 
whose eight-page 2009 Sustainable Development Report highlights above all the satisfaction 
of its employees, the diversity of past histories and present strategies must also be taken into 
account. 
Translated by Richard Crabtree 
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